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Abstract
In this study, we propose the leveraging of interpretabil-
ity for tasks beyond purely the purpose of explainability.
In particular, this study puts forward a novel strategy for
leveraging gradient-based interpretability in the realm of
adversarial examples, where we use insights gained to aid
adversarial learning. More specifically, we introduce the
concept of spatially constrained one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations, where we guide the learning of such adversarial
perturbations towards more susceptible areas identified via
gradient-based interpretability. Experimental results us-
ing different benchmark datasets show that such a spatially
constrained one-pixel adversarial perturbation strategy can
noticeably improve the speed of convergence as well as pro-
duce successful attacks that were also visually difficult to
perceive, thus illustrating an effective use of interpretability
methods for tasks outside of the purpose of purely explain-
ability.
1. Introduction
In recent times, gradient-based interpretability has
grown into a significant area of research in the field of ex-
plainable artificial intelligence (XAI). Gradient-based inter-
pretability is generally leveraged to understand data sensi-
tivity [6, 7, 10], where the most sensitive areas responsible
for a particular prediction made are identified. In particular,
much of previous literature in XAI centers around leverag-
ing gradient-based interpretability for highlighting the re-
gions of interest for any given input to explain the decision
making process of deep neural networks.
More recently, there has been some attention in explor-
ing the use of gradient-based interpretability for purposes
other than purely explainability. For example, Zhou et.
al. [10] proposed the use of gradient-based interpretability
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to improve the localization performance of deep neural net-
works. A number of research studies [3, 5] have leveraged
sensitivity maps produced via gradient-based interpretabil-
ity as initialization for the task of segmentation. However,
leveraging gradient-based interpretability for tasks beyond
explainability is still not well explored outside of these
few examples, making further investigations into alterna-
tive directions for leveraging insights gained through inter-
pretability ripe for exploration.
In this study, we investigate and put forward a novel
strategy for leveraging gradient-based interpretability in the
realm of adversarial examples, where the goal is to produce
delicately perturbed inputs designed to mislead machine
learning models towards incorrect predictions. More specif-
ically, we introduce the concept of spatially constrained
one-pixel adversarial perturbations, guided by gradient-
based interpretability such that insights gained via inter-
pretability is used to aid adversarial learning. One-pixel
adversarial perturbations [9] is an extreme case of adver-
sarial examples where only one pixel is modified to fool
a model into providing the wrong prediction. This pixel
is found through Differential Evolution[1], where a popu-
lation of candidate pixels is randomly modified to create
children that compete with its parents for fitness in the next
iteration; this fitness criterion being the probabilistic pre-
dicted label. The optimal pixels for one-pixel adversarial
perturbations usually lie in positions of interest. This obser-
vation motivates us to leverage gradient-based interpretabil-
ity to constrain the differential evolution initialization; we
posit that, by ensuring that the initial population of pixels
lie in positions of interest as given by generated sensitivity
maps, the optimization algorithm for generating one-pixel
adversarial perturbations can converge faster with fewer it-
erations. Furthermore, by guiding it towards areas of inter-
est, the produced attacks may also be more visually difficult
to perceive.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the proposed strategy for leveraging gradient-based inter-
pretability in the realm of adversarial examples. Section 3
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presents and discusses the experimental results for studying
the efficacy of the proposed strategy on several benchmark
datasets (CIFAR-10 and NIPS-W). Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section 4.
2. Methodology
In this section, we will provide a detailed description of
the proposed strategy for leveraging gradient-based inter-
pretability in the realm of adversarial examples, which is
designed to improve the speed of convergence for produc-
ing adversarial perturbations by using insights gained to aid
adversarial learning.
2.1. Spatially constrained one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations
In one-pixel adversarial perturbations, the optimal pixel
is found by using Differential Evolution (DE). For every
individual adversarial perturbation, a set of N vectors in
R5 - where each vector p represents a candidate pixel’s xy-
coordinates and RGB values - is randomly generated, giv-
ing the initial parent population. This initialization serves as
input to the differential evolution optimization. For each it-
eration during optimization, N children are generated from
the parent population, and the fittest pixels i.e., the ones
providing the lowest probabilistic label for the correct class
remain to become N parents in the next iteration.
We hypothesize that the probability of susceptibility is
highest in areas that are identified as highly sensitive via
gradient-based interpretability. Therefore, we posit that
using sensitivity maps generated via gradient-based inter-
pretability as a spatial constraint when generating the initial
parent population should speed up DE convergence.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the pipeline for the genera-
tion of spatially constrained one-pixel adversarial perturba-
tions on an image.
2.2. Susceptibility set generation
The first step involves the identification of a set of sus-
ceptible pixels S based on insights gained via gradient-
based interpretability. More specifically, we leverage
SmoothGrad [8] to obtain a sensitivity map s for each im-
age x, with each pixel in s providing a quantitative indica-
tor of importance of the underlying content to the decision
making process. To identify the set of susceptible pixels S,
binary thresholding is performed on the sensitivity map s as
follows:
s(x) =
1
n
n∑
1
sˆ(x+N (0, σ2)); S = {s(x) > τ} (1)
This is based on the assumption that the pixels with
higher sensitivity in the generated sensitivity maps are more
susceptible to attack.
(a) Susceptibility set generation.
(b) One-pixel adversarial perturbation generation.
Figure 1: Pipeline for the generation of spatially con-
strained one-pixel adversarial perturbations. (a) The set of
susceptible pixels is identified via sensitivity thresholding
on a sensitivity map obtained using SmoothGrad. (b) The
pixel perturbation, identified based on spatial constraint via
the set of susceptible pixels, is performed to the image to
obtain the adversarial example. The coordinate of the ad-
versarially perturbed pixel is showed on top of the output
image.
2.3. Adversarial perturbation generation
The second step involves leveraging the set of suscep-
tible pixels for guiding the adversarial learning process.
More specifically, when initializing the population for DE,
the X and Y values in each vector p for given image x
are constrained to be selected from within the set of S i.e.,
X,Y ∈ S to ensure that the initial population of pixels all
lie in the susceptible regions of the image.
p(x) = {X,Y, r, g, b}; (X,Y ) ∈ S
max
p(x)
fadv(x+ p(x)) ∨ ||p(x)||0 ≤ 1 (2)
3. Experiments and Results
To evaluate the efficacy of spatially constrained one-
pixel adversarial perturbations in reducing the convergence
time of DE, we conducted different experiments on the DE
algorithm (both in duration as well as average number of
iterations) at finding a susceptible pixel with and without
constrained initialization. Experiments were done for two
different datasets: i) CIFAR-10 [4], and ii) NIPS 2017 ad-
versarial attacks and defences challenge dataset [2] (small
subset derived from ImageNet), referred to as NIPS-W in
Figure 2: Example images from ImageNet (left) and the
corresponding spatially constrained one-pixel adversarial
perturbed image (right) that led to successful attacks. The
coordinates of the perturbed pixels are shown on the right-
hand side.
the rest of the paper. The network tested in this study was
SqueezeNet.
We select the default set of 100 images taken from the
CIFAR-10 dataset in [9]. Additionally, for conducting a
larger set of experiments, we randomly select 500 images
from NIPS-W. For all experiments, we set the threshold τ
at 0.5. For each dataset, five different runs of the adversarial
attack were performed with different random seeds.
Table 1: Results of constrained one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations on 100 images from CIFAR-10 dataset. For both
constrained and unconstrained perturbations, the total time
in seconds, average time in seconds, and the average num-
ber of DE iterations are presented. Five runs for constrained
and unconstrained one-pixel adversarial perturbations show
that constrained perturbations converge faster.
Unconstrained Constrained (ours)
T (s) AVG T (s) AVG # itr T (s) AVG T (s) AVG # itr
207.98 2.08 35.61 37.15 0.56 2.52
216.00 2.16 37.40 35.36 0.54 2.33
212.10 2.12 36.72 34.16 0.52 2.26
210.71 2.11 36.39 37.03 0.58 2.52
210.72 2.11 36.24 36.05 0.55 2.40
The results for the CIFAR-10 and NIPS-W datasets are
summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. It can
be clearly observed that across different runs and on av-
erage, the constrained one-pixel adversarial perturbations
converged faster with comparatively less number of itera-
tions when compared to conventional one-pixel adversarial
perturbations. This effect is more pronounced for CIFAR-
10, with the spatially constrained one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations converging 6× faster than conventional attacks.
Therefore, it can be clearly observed that by guiding the
adversarial learning process for one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations towards areas of strong susceptibility based on
insights gained by gradient-based interpretability, one can
accelerate the optimization process to converge in a much
more rapid manner.
Example images from ImageNet that were successfully
attacked and their corresponding spatially constrained one-
pixel adversarial perturbed images are shown in Fig. 2.
It can be observed that the perturbed images, which re-
sulted in successful attacks given that the tested network
(SqueezeNet in this study) provided incorrect predictions
compared to the original images, look very perceptually
similar to the original images with the perturbed pixel vi-
sually hidden in most cases. The visual imperceptibility
gained when leveraging the proposed spatially constrained
one-pixel adversarial perturbation strategy stems from the
fact that the adversarial learning process was guided to-
wards sensitivity areas in the images that have complex de-
tails that conceal the perturbation well.
4. Conclusion
In this work, we presented a novel strategy in the realm
of adversarial examples that leverage gradient-based in-
terpretability, thus illustrate the use of such methods be-
yond purely the purpose of explainability. In particular,
we introduce a spatially constrained one-pixel adversar-
ial perturbation strategy that leverages identified sensitiv-
Table 2: Results of constrained one-pixel adversarial per-
turbations on the NIPS-W dataset. For both constrained and
unconstrained successful attacks, the total time in seconds,
average time in seconds, and average number of DE itera-
tions are presented. Five runs for constrained and uncon-
strained one-pixel adversarial perturbations show that con-
strained perturbations converge faster.
Constrained (ours) Unconstrained
T (s) AVG T (s) AVG # itr T (s) AVG T (s) AVG # itr
355.69 6.03 6.44 445.55 8.25 8.80
392.21 6.88 7.63 523.31 8.58 9.70
446.09 7.31 8.13 516.71 8.62 9.52
344.90 5.95 6.45 459.81 7.79 8.75
416.18 7.19 7.86 559.48 9.32 10.60
ity within an image based on gradient-based interpretabil-
ity, thus leveraging insights gained to aid adversarial learn-
ing. Detailed experiments and evaluations were done to
show that leveraging gradient-based interpretability can be
used for faster convergence of one-pixel adversarial pertur-
bations. We hope this work will allow for further develop-
ment of gradient-based interpretability methods to be used
for many more tasks and use cases beyond purely explain-
ability.
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